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REPLY ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL C O U R T ERRED W H E N IT DETERMINED THAT
DEFENDANT/APPELLEE'S E M P L O Y M E N T AS A SCHOOL
TEACHER SUBSEQUENT TO THE ENTRY OF THE
D E C R E E OF DIVORCE DID N O T CONSTITUTE A
SUBSTANTIAL
AND
MATERIAL
CHANGE
IN
CIRCUMSTANCE SUFFICIENT T O M O D I F Y T H E D E C R E E
OF DIVORCE.
M r s . Peterson erroneously argues that D r Petei -i
Bridenbaugh v. Bridenbaugh. 786 P.2d 241 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) because it w a s enacted prior to
>ld si i ::: v\ ii ig tl itat 1:1 le alleged si ibstai itial
material change of circumstance be something that w a s not foreseeable at the time of the divorce.
H o w e v e r , Bridenbaugh has not been overruled.

Additionally, M r s . Petersen ignores the explicit

language of Bridenbaugh that a a party seeking modification of a prior alimony award bears the burden
of establishing that a substantial change of circumstances has occurred which justifies modification."
Bridenbaugh. 786

»..idenbaugh is dlmiYl! ,' applicahli

" Ii in

examining whether a substantial change in circumstances has occurred in the current case.
A*^ sLulli,1 I I III II ii ("Vlcrsai s original Brief, Bridenbaugh is especially persuasive because
t h e facts are virtually identical t o t h e case at hand. (Brief o f Appellant Gary V. Petersen at p . 12).
Both cases involve marriages of long duration in which t h e wife w a s not employed outside the home.
In b o t h cases, the husband w a s ordered t o pay child support and alimon)

(Cf. Bridenbaugh. 786

P.2d at 241 and R.16, R. 107, T.36, R. 213). Subsequent to the divorce, both wives earned postgraduate degrees and set

*

*

.*• ; ^ ^ o n b a u g h . VKihi III" ,M »n1 MJ ,uitl I s;? Si p

11C

)-

30 and R. 108). Approximately fifteen years after the decree w a s entered, both husbands filed a

4

Petition to Modify for the specific purpose of terminating alimony (Cf Bridenbaugh. 786 P 2d at 241
and R 15-18) At the time they filed their petitions to modify, the income of both husbands had
increased eight-fold (Cf Bridenbaugh. 786 P 2d at 242 and R 107-108, Appellant's Addendum 6,
Tf6, p 2) Additionally, Mrs Bridenbaugh's income increased from nothing to approximately
$22,000.00 while Mrs Petersen's income has increased from nothing to $46,000 00 (Cf
Bridenbaugh. 786 P 2d at 242 and R 108, T 82 R 259) In both cases, at the time the petition to
modify was filed, the wives were only supporting themselves and were earning a significant
percentage of what their husbands earned to support a large family while the parties were married
(Cf Bridenbaugh. 786 P 2d at 242-3 and Appellant's Brief at 12) In Bridenbaugh. these facts were
sufficient to demonstrate a substantial change in circumstances since the divorce Bridenbaugh. 786
P.2d at 243 Similarly, the facts are sufficient to demonstrate a substantial change in circumstances
in the current case
In addition to the factors cited above, all six of the parties' children are now
emancipated and none are living with Mrs Petersen She has refinanced the house to the point where
her monthly obligation is now between $400 and $500 less than it was when the parties were married.
She has deposited a remaining portion of her inheritance in savings, approximately $23,000. She
contributes substantially to her 401(k), in the amount of approximately $7,500 per year. She has well
over $50,000 in that account

She also participates in the Utah State Retirement System. She

voluntarily purchases life insurance on the appellant's life at a monthly cost of $285. She lives in a
5,000 square foot home, which has an equity in excess of a quarter of a million dollars. She has no
monthly expenses except for those necessary to run her household and pay for her moderate
5

mortgage obligation. In sum, Mrs. Petersen'sfinancialcondition has significantly improved. Clearly,
a substantial change of circumstances has occurred since the decree was entered.
The evidence before the court plainly illustrates that this material change in
circumstances was not contemplated within the decree of divorce. The parties did not anticipate that
Mrs. Petersen would be employed as a school teacher and earning in excess of $46,000.00 per year.
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law state that "defendant's ability to secure a teaching
position is speculative." (Appellee's Addendum 1 at U 5 p. 4). Additionally, the express intention of
Mrs. Petersen was to pursue an education in a field other than teaching. (Appellee's Addendum 1
at f 5 p. 4). In fact, the Appellate Court found that Mrs. Petersen's gainful employment would
constitute a substantial change in circumstances warranting a readjustment in the amount of alimony.
Petersen v. Petersen. 737 P.2d 237, 243 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
The trial court recognized that Mrs. Petersen would likely need to seek employment
"in order to assist in providing partial support for herself and the parties' minor children." (Appellee's
Addendum 1 at % 9 p. 6)(emphasis added). But there is no indication that the parties anticipated that
Mrs. Petersen would become self-sufficient.

Mrs. Petersen argues that the trial court erred in

calculating that she would only be able to earn 1/4 to 1/5 the amount of Dr. Petersen. (Appellee's
Brief at p. 6). However, this argument is misleading. First, at the time the court made this estimate,
they found that Dr. Petersen could earn approximately $100,000.00 per year. (Appellee's Addendum
1 at \ 5 p. 4) In other words, the court concluded that Mrs. Petersen could earn between $20,000.00
and $25,000.00 per year. Much to the parties' surprise, Mrs. Petersen now earns nearly twice that
amount. Additionally, this argument disregards the following,
6

[T]he purpose of alimony is to allow the recipient spouse a standard
of living as close as possible to that experienced during the marriage,
not to provide subsequent improvements to keep pace with those of
the payor spouse.
Bridenbaugh, 786 P.2d at 243(emphasis added). In other words, the disparity in the parties' income
is not a reason to continue Dr. Petersen's alimony obligation. The trial court erred when it
determined that Mrs. Petersen's employment as a school teacher subsequent to the entry of the decree
of divorce did not constitute a substantial and material change in circumstance sufficient to modify
the decree of divorce, as amended.
Mrs. Petersen argues that even if her employment were not foreseeable, a reduction
in alimony is not warranted. However, this argument is without merit. The trial court must consider
the following factors when modifying an alimony award:
(1) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; (2) the
recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; (3) the
ability of the payor or spouse to provide support; and (4) the length
of the marriage.
Williamson v. Williamson. 1999 WL 439265 (Utah Ct. App. 1999)(citing Utah Code Ann. § 30-35(7)(a) (1988)). In order to reduce or terminate alimony, the trial court must be persuaded that "[the
receiving spouse] will be able to support herself at a standard of living to which she was accustomed
during the parties' marriage." Fullmer v. Fullmer 761 P.2d 942, 951 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Mrs. Petersen, at present, makes between 46 and 47 percent of the total family income earned
by Dr. Petersen to support a family of eight at the time the parties were divorced. However, she can
utilize that entire income of approximately $46,000 to $47,000 per year for her own support. By her
own admission, she paid off all of her bills in 1995. She has savings of not less than $23,000 in
7

obligation
for the support of any person other than herself. She owns a home with substantial equit\
obvious that she is capable of providing for herself a standard of living that is better than the standard
of living that she enjoyed at the time that the parties were divorced. Mrs. Petersen's argument that
"1983 dollars are not the same as 1999 dollars" was not controlling in Bridenbaugh and is similarly
irrelevat
Mrs.

i

bridenbau^

Petersen has the ability to support herself at the standard of living to which she was accustomed

during MIL |MI lie: ' iiiiiiiiiia|:»r .iiiiiiil iiiin iiJili lilnii J,! MIL decree IS warranted.

CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully requests that this Coi u 11 everse the ti ial coi in ill s determination
that there is no material change of circumstances sufficient to warrant termination of alimony and
i n n i l nil i Ill In i 111 / I ni mi ill

ill mi 1 i mi I I ni ni mi ni I mi mi in I 111 mi ni III

mi ni III mi iiiiiii

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^

l u l l mi i i n mi ni mi 1 1 " i nil h i i i I I ni ill i mi mi mi I i i i g

day of August, 1999.

RICHARDS, BRAND"! , 'MILLER
& NELSON
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